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The Problem 
D + D + S = ERT 




The market for derivatives has endured a substantial transformation and scrutiny since 
the 2007/08 financial crisis.1 This subprime or credit crunch disaster seriously 
undermined what fuels business ‘Trust’,  therefore customers lost faith in financial 
institutions. Banks’ ledger manipulation reached unacceptable levels by  moving debt 
off the books during auditing times and assigning speculative high values to hard-to-
value assets, which ultimately had not value at all.2 All of these led to serious 
concerns about financial services integrity. Understandably, the market was hurt thus; 
sharp expressions like ‘Lehman Brothers is often Exhibit A in the breakdown of trust 
in the twenty-first century’3 are used. At the heart of the subprime crisis laid 
collateralised debt obligations (CDO’s), credit default swaps (CDS’s) and the 
derivative financial instruments created and privately traded over the counter. There 
were three main features in the over the counter derivatives market (OTC), namely 
Deregulation, Secrecy and Descentralisation which added to or triggered the crisis. 
The unregulated (OTC) market operated under the premise that banks would design 
products and adapt to the incumbent demands of the financial ecosystem therefore 
develop their own rules. Sadly, excessive unethical profit driven practices infested 
this liberalised segment of the market. Secrecy on the other hand exacerbated the 
problem because OTC derivatives traded bilaterally or privately and did not need to 
go through any central clearing counterparty so the system was mainly uncontrollable. 
This explains why governments could not exactly assess from the onset the magnitude 
of the financial crisis.   
The question at that time was whether stakeholders including Fintech4 startups, should 
remain passive or proactive hence, the ‘Dichotomy’ faced by financial innovators, 
                                                          
1 ISDA Whitepaper The Future of Derivatives Processing and Market Infrastructure, 2016 available at 
https://www.isda.org/a/B9EDE/infrastructure-white-paper.pdf. [Accessed 20 Jan. 2019] 
2 Casey MJ & Vigna P, The Truth Machine The Blockchain and the Future of Everything, Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2018 at 21 
3 Ibid 
4 Fintech simply means the “use of technology to deliver financial services and products to 
consumers.” Madir J, Fintech Law and Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 at 1  
was to insist with a system based on trust in financial institutions, or explore others 
more transparent where neither trust nor were banks, as intermediaries, indispensable 
for the successful and safe completion of financial transactions.  
The latter idea prevailed and developed a series of important platforms,5 which came 
to disrupt or incrementally benefit financial services thus changing not only the 
payments landscape, but also the structure of the service itself. The OTC market is 
experiencing these changes and it is gradually becoming a smart system. 
One could look at the smart OTC market from three different angles: as depository or 
record keeping of transactions (Blockchain), as contract executing system (Smart 
Contracts) and regulatory (Regulation).  
The aim of this piece of research is to analyse to what extent innovative technology 
such Blockchain with embedded smart contracts, may affect the way the ‘Over the 
Counter’ (OTC) market operates, by providing investors with a trustworthy platform 
for the efficient assessment of the risk behind certain financial instruments. 
Consequently, the market will be more resilient when another financial crisis strikes. It 
approaches the problem from a pure practical or investment perspective namely how to 
deliver the OTC service to consumers. Albeit this article touches upon regulatory 
matters and the desirable use of central counterparties (CCP’s) for clearing, regulation 
per se will be the subject matter of the author’s future research outputs. It is necessary 
to emphasise indeed that the over the counter derivative market still softly regulated 
therefore, identifying some advantages and disadvantages of using Blockchain may 
help future legislation.  
 
1. What is Blockchain?  
 
One of the most prominent post financial crisis  innovations was the possibility of 
transacting with a digitally created  currency 'Bitcoin' by using an open yet secure 
system called ‘Blockchain’,6 which built on  distributed ledger technology ‘DLT’ 
developed several years earlier.7 The main feature of a DLT is that a number of copies 
or records disseminate across stakeholders in contrast with a centralised ledger 
system, as shown by figure 1 below. The monopoly of having a unique centralised 
copy disappears along with its controlling power. In a DLT, each participant has a 




                                                          
5 Peer-to-peer lending, asset management, mobile payments, remittances and fundraising  
6 Nakamoto, S, Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, available at https://bitcoin.org/ 
bitcoin.pdf. [Accessed 30 Nov. 2018]. 




Fig 1 Source: Distributed (left) vs. centralized (right) system architecture in Drescher D, BLOCKCHAIN BASICS, 
A NON-TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION IN 25 STEPS, Apress, 2017 p 11. 
 
However, DLT was never efficient in both dealing and controlling the tampering of 
single copies because they were scattered in several computers and networks. Then 
Blockchain appeared. 
Blockchain supplemented DLT by incorporating an algorithmically controlled system 
whereby, the information added to the ledger is vetted by consensus, resistant to 
changes, shared peer-to-peer and retrievable. Even though the launching of Bitcoin 
unraveled Blockchain technology, both concepts are different so a distinction is 
important. Blockchain is the underlying system used to transact with the 
cryptocurrency and Bitcoin or indeed any other cryptocurrency, is the transferable 
intangible asset itself.8 They are both connected yet they do not mean the same.  
Defining  Blockchain  could either be too narrow or too wide nevertheless in general 
it is   as an underlying DLT  technology supported by an unknown number of users 
(Nodes) who by joining and contributing with their own computational resources, run 
a decentralised peer-to-peer network for the verification, authentication and exchange 
of data.  Such data is organised in tamper resistant blocks or ledgers connected with a 
crypto key or algorithm   without which, their content and history is irretrievable thus, 
making the stored information safe and trustworthy. 
In no time Blockchain resolved at least two of the flaws of DLT technology namely, 
there was no need to maintain a centralised main copy because every stakeholder 
would have an identical one and the tampering of one copy would automatically 
generate new algorithms, which will not pass the consensus or validation mechanism 
hence, keeping the records transparent and immutable.  
                                                          
8 There are more than one thousand cryptocurrencies operating worldwide. More recently, the United 
Kingdom Jurisdiction Taskforce has confirmed that cryptocurrencies are assets as any other thus 
susceptible of ownership. The LawTech Delivery Panel , UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, Legal statement 
on cryptoassets and smart contracts, Nov 2019 
 
From the above definition, five features underpinning blockchains are worth 
mentioning:  
 It is a peer-to-peer network whose partakers (Nodes) do not necessarily know 
each other nor need to trust each other. They could be located in different 
places and jurisdictions. 
 The network transfers data in ledgers also called blocks, which contain all 
relevant information for example: assets, price, party’s names and timestamp, 
leading to a chronological sequence of records, transactions or inputs.  
 Each block has its own digital signature or cryptographic hash, which makes it 
distinguishable and unique.  
   In order to join the chain, the cryptographic hash is subject to a validation 
process, which consists in decrypting the algorithm, by using deep internet 
computational resources and rewarding the miner (whoever decrypts the 
algorithm) with part of the proceeds of the original transaction.  
 Once validation takes place, the block affixes to the chain by consensus 
mechanisms also called proof algorithms.  
 
A very simple illustration of how a blockchain would look like is the following:    
 
 
Fig 2 source: Adolfo Paolini (algorithms use far more complex combinations of letters and numbers)  
 
 
1.1 Types of Blockchains ( Advantages and Disadvantages)  
 
One could try to find what the rationale for classifying blockchains in public and 
private is. There is not a single argument in favour of either nevertheless; it seems that 
two main features drive this distinction. The first one is who can actually access the 
chain and the second what incentive motivates participants.   
B sends R £ 80
Previous Hash ABC Hash 12ab3c
M sends B £100
Previous Hash 123 Hash ABC
M has £200
Genesis Block Hash 123
Open or public permissionless blockchains, as their name suggests, are freely 
accessible to whoever wants to join. In permissionless blockchains, trust is virtually 
irrelevant in the sense that anybody from anywhere could take part. One pitfall is 
nevertheless that this ecosystem is perfect for market predators and malicious 
participants who could freely connect. A brilliant feature of Bitcoin is that it addresses 
the above concern by motivating honest behavior thus rewarding miners with a share 
of the transaction. Another fear is  that 51% stake in the network would give the 
majority required to validate fraudulent transactions so the blockchain system is 
flawed however, the cost of acquiring the computational resources to dominate the 
network will arguably outweigh  any fraudulent gain. In other words, why one would 
invest on one occasion £1000 to steal £1 once?  
Closed or private permissioned blockchains work slightly different. In fact identifying 
beforehand the stakeholders enlightens its trustworthy feature and gives a better sense 
of security. These types of blockchains incentivize their members by giving the 
possibility of achieving common purposes or goals thus, the decryption reward is less 
important. What matters is fulfilling the objective.  Permissioned blockchains design 
includes a controller party of consortium whose main job is to develop the criteria for 
joining and scrutinising and approving the nodes in the system.  Consequently, vetted 
nodes provide a sense of trustworthiness to the chain. In other words, the governance 
of private blockchains is tailor-made to the needs of a group and its objectives.  
One could suggest that individual governance or centralised governance impinges on 
the real purpose of blockchain namely distributing vetted ledgers across participants, 
yet monopolising the power to control the network.9 For the purpose of this research, 
the question therefore is how the market for financial derivatives could control 
transactions if nobody has the authority to decide who could or not take part in the 
network.  An early conclusion would be that permissioned blockchains are the most 
suitable types to effectively regulate and control the derivatives market.  
It is also important to emphasise that network members may have different rights and 
roles:  read, write and /or commit. The following table by Hileman and Rauch10 
clearly shows these rights and roles. 
  
                                                          
9 Finck M, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 pp 
196 
10 Hileman, G and Rauchs, M, 2017 Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study (September 22, 2017). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3040224 
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Fig 3 source: Hileman, G and Rauchs, M, 2017 Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study (September 22, 2017). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3040224 at p 20 
 
Consequently, what are the advantages and disadvantages of public v. private 
blockchains?  Let us deal with some of them accordingly 
 Public Blockchains have the advantage of being open access therefore 
allowing nodes to take part and locate in different jurisdictions without 
restrictions. Private Blockchains restrict access to specific nodes in the 
network so the advantage is that of accepting only vetted nodes, 
leaving outside market predators or nodes whose previous financial 
records or credit history may cause concerns.  
 Public Blockchains may substantially reduce computational costs 
because nodes will freely join and provide their own computational 
resources. Some jurisdictions where energy costs are cheap are more 
attractive to mining farmers. Private on the other hand are selective and 
may choose where the majority of nodes or the required 51%, are in 
order to control and effectively monitor the network. 
 Previous one leads to the next private blockchain disadvantage, the 
cost of running and controlling the chain is far more expensive that a 
totally distributed or public one. 
 Network governance happens to be the most important advantage for 
the purpose of this case study.  In Private Blockchains, the consortia 
will choose whom takes part by additionally granting access to, for 
example, financial regulators and anti- money laundering policing 
bodies. This seems the most effective way to tackle financial crime and 
prevent data miss-use.    
 Joining a Private Blockchain may carry large membership costs, which 




2. Smart Contracts  
 
Fintech also welcomed ‘Ethereum’,11  and the brilliance of Vitalik Buterin whose 
major contribution was to expand the application of Blockchain beyond Bitcoins, 
creating the possibility of using this underlying technology in a wide range of 
activities namely, personal identity, dynamic health records, remittances, settlement 
and clearing systems, public voting just to mention some.12 All of this has been 
possible thanks to the development of ‘Smart Contracts’13 the pillar of Ethereum 
success.   
Smart contracts carry two different yet related meanings namely legal and 
computational (software).  The first one is as smart legal contract in the sense that it is 
a contract like any other yet its performance executes automatically  on distributed 
ledger technology; the second one, more properly defined as smart contract code, is 
the software that automates the legal contract.14  
Contract execution improves by having a Smart Contract at the application layer of 
the blockchain stack15 with the resulting outcome of speeding up transaction 
processes and reducing costs.  As algorithmic, self-executing and self-enforcing 
computer programmes,16 smart contracts embedded in the blockchain will be essential 
in the so-called Smart OTC platform.    
Smart contracts  are very efficient in completing transactions for example, dividing 
payments between stakeholders however, agreements may require and usually do, 
certain rules of conduct that contracting parties must fulfil. For example, an insurance 
policy may require the insured to lock the windows before leaving the house 
                                                          
11  Buterin V,  A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralised Application Platform, Ethereum 
White Paper available at http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/Ethereum_white_paper 
a_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf  
12 Diedrich H, Ethereum: what is Ethereum Used for?, Wildfire Publishing, 2015,  at 58  
13 Szabo N, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, First Monday 2, No 9 
September 1997, available at http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469 
14 Clack CD & Vanca G, Temporal Aspects of Smart Contracts for Financial Derivatives, Centre for 
Blockchain Technologies, Department of Computer Science, University College London, p1,  available 
at  http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/C.Clack/research/ClackTemporalAspectsSmartContracts.pdf 
15 Deminors M, Opening Remarks: Ethereum Classic Summit Hong Kong. Available at 
https://etcsummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ETCSummit_Day-1_MD-Intro-Slides.pdf 
(Accessed 4 Dec 2019) 
16 Lauslahti K, Mattila J & Seppala T, Smart Contracts- How will Blockchain Technology Affect 
Contractual Practices? The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, 2017, No 68 at 2. 
unattended, even statutes require company directors to act in good faith (very subjective 
indeed), for the benefit of the company. Smart contracts cannot resolve or account for 
these ‘open-ended rights’17 and rules of conduct consequently, it is crucial that 
developers address the issue of contract formation, in the first place, so the execution 
of the OTC clearing and settling would be more functional or at least less vulnerable to 
trading disputes. In other words, developers need to address the issue of events, which 
occur outside the pre-coded contractual language and may affect contractual 
enforceability.18 Clark and Vanca have cleverly provided a definition of smart 
contracts, which includes both internal and external elements, as follows: 
“A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable agreement. Automatable by 
computer, although some parts may require human input and control. Enforceable either 
by legal enforcement of rights and obligations or via tamper-proof execution of 
computer code.”19 
A potential solution or innovative idea to these open-ended legal events is the 
application of artificial intelligence in a kind of cognitive app for testing legal 
hypotheses,20 albeit this sounds very ambitious indeed.  
 
3. The OTC Market New Dimension and the Road to Smart Centralised 
Counterparties 
 
Following the 2007/08 collapse of the subprime mortgage market, investors lost 
significant amounts, and most painfully still, unsuccessfully claimed for negligent 
misrepresentation. UK courts were of the view, that sophisticated investors knew 
market volatility and were in a position to assess the risk.21 The Libor22 scandal did not 
help either, it was then clear that banks manipulated the interest rates used to price 
financial instruments. It was impossible for investors, other than banks, to know the 
real value of such instruments therefore; they heavily relied on credit rating agencies 
(also part of the culprits list).23  
All of these significantly affected the appetite for credit default swaps whose notional 
amounts of contracts fell from $61.2 trillion in 2007 to $ 9.4 trillion ten years later; 
                                                          
17 De Filippi P, Wright A, Blockchain and The Law. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press.  2018 at p.77 
18 Bacon L, Brook N, Bazinas G, Smart Contracts: Where Law Meets Technology, Clyde and Co 
Inside, available: https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/smart-contracts-where-law-meets-
technology.  [June 2016] 
19 Clack CD & Vanca G, Temporal Aspects of Smart Contracts for Financial Derivatives, Centre for 
Blockchain Technologies, Department of Computer Science, University College London, p 2,  
available at  http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/C.Clack/research/Clack-
TemporalAspectsSmartContracts.pdf 
20 Ashley, K, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press. 2017  p.354 
21 Paolini A, ‘Lending Sub-Prime and Advising on Financial Investments from a D&O Insurance 
Perspective’, JBL [2012] Issue 5, pages 432-448. 
22 London  Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
23 Labrosse JR, Olivares-Caminal R & Singh Dalvinder,  Financial Crisis Management and Bank 
Resolution, London, UK, 2009  Informa 
furthermore, the share of inter-dealer trades fell from 53% to 25% between mid-2011 
and end-2017.24 Conversely the amounts cleared via central counterparties (CCPs), 
went up from 17% to 55% within the same period.25 As a result, market stakeholders 
developed specific concerns about the operation of OTC’s  as follows:  
• It was very difficult to quantify the OTC market in the sense that it has grown to such 
an extent that it poses a risk to the financial market. 
• OTC’s are bilateral  thus the parties involved could create a variety of contracts, which 
could lead to unknown risks to the financial system. 
• Being privately negotiated, outside regulated exchanges, means that they are usually 
beyond regulators control. 26  Regulators then acted accordingly. 
Unsurprisingly, regulators did not waste any time and started to join efforts in finding 
responses to the 2007/08 crisis. In the United States for example The Volcker Rule, 
supported by The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),27 
came into force on April 1 2014, with full implementation as from July 21 2015, was 
enacted. It is part of the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010, which aims at preventing investment banks from ‘prop trading or making bets 
with their own capital’,28 thus limiting the possibility of making speculative 
investments with their own accounts which if wrong, could trigger a systemic risk. 
According to CBInsights, the trading of JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, 
Goldman Sacks and Morgan Stanley in 2009 was almost $100 Billion for speculative 
trading alone. This figure, following the Volcker’s rule came down to a combined profit 
of $71 Billion in 2017, which represents 30% fall compared to the previous decade.29 
The United Kingdom also welcomed the Vickers Report, which introduced the ring 
fencing principle, applicable to banks offering both retail (private) and investment or 
universal banking services. The principle literally consists  in ring fencing retail 
banking capital and exposure from the investment banking one, so the high risk to 
which the latter is exposed to may not affect or at least reduce the risk of the enclosed 
or protected private banking limb of the financial institution.  
In regard to the OTC market in particular, One of its loopholes was (or still is) the fact 
that bilateral or non-central counter party agreements (non-CCPs) were private, 
unavailable to the general public thus  lacked  transparency with the undesired outcome 
                                                          
24 Aldasoro I & Ehlers T, The Credit Default Swap Market: what a difference a decade makes, BIS 
Quarterly Review, June 2018 pp 1-10 at 2 
25 Aldasoro I & Ehlers T, The Credit Default Swap Market: what a difference a decade makes, BIS 
Quarterly Review, June 2018 pp 1-10 at 4 
26 Brian O’Loughlin B and O’Brien F, Fundamentals of Investments a Practitioners Guide, 3rd Edition, 
Routledge 2019 p 201 
27 CFA Institute, the Volcker Rule, available at 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/issues/volcker-rule  
28 CB Insights, Killing The I-Bank: The Disruption Of Investment Banking, available at 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/disrupting-investment-banking/ p 37 
29 Ibid  
of  making it very  difficult to monitor. The main idea was to replace this with a system, 
which incentivizes centralised clearing then the European Union also responded. 
 The European Market Infrastructure Regulation on Derivatives, Central Counterparties 
and Trade Repositories (EMIR) as from June 2016, aims at increasing  transparency in 
the OTC derivatives markets, mitigating credit risk and reducing operational risk.30 It 
requires using centralised clearing system, for all standardised OTC derivative 
contracts otherwise CCPs must apply risk mitigation techniques and  comply with 
stringent prudential, organisational and conduct of business requirements.31 
For the purpose of this piece of research, it is necessary to highlight that EMIR, 
concerned with  reducing the operational risk associated with fraud and human error, 
encourages the use of ‘electronic means’ to speed up the confirmation stage of the OTC 
contractual terms.32 Furthermore, in order to enhance transparency EMIR has 
introduced reporting requirements, which are worth quoting in here:  
“Under the regulation 
 detailed information on each derivative contract has to be reported to trade 
repositories and made available to supervisory authorities 
 trade repositories have to publish aggregate positions by class of derivatives, for 
both OTC and listed derivatives 
 the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is responsible for 
surveillance of trade repositories and for granting and withdrawing 
accreditation”33 
Arguably,  DLT and blockchain technologies could play wonders in assisting with 
tamper resistant electronic data including trade repositories so the goals of EMIR 
regulation will be easy achievable.  
Basel III also reacted to the financial crisis and implemented some innovative ideas aim 
at minimizing the effects of systemic risk by promoting amongst other ‘central 
clearing’. Now, it will be impossible to address all the Basel III reaction to the 2007/08 
crisis thus let us focus on some of the more relevant, as they affect the OTC market.  
First, as part of the counterparty credit risk strategy, it promotes capital incentives to 
use counterparties for derivatives. As clearing houses guarantee by novation, with or 
without margins, that payments, deliveries and settlements happen; it becomes obvious 
that using trustworthy CCPs will result, in principle, in more stable markets.  
Secondly, reduced reliance on external credit rating requires banks to conduct enough 
due diligence when using external rating agencies or data and demands, having 
sufficient and detailed non-ratings-based approach for other jurisdictions unable or 
reluctant to rely external credit ratings.34 According to the then Financial Services 
                                                          





34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, Finalising Basel III in 
Brief, December 2017, available at   https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_inbrief.pdf 
Authority, between 2007-2009 the estimated actual default losses, incurred by banks,  
were five times smaller than the losses connected with the credit rating risk associated 
with the counterparty.35  Accordingly, Basel III introduced the CVA capital charge as 
“a protection against mark-to- market losses caused by increase in the credit spread of 
the counterparty”36 and most importantly, such charge was exempted in exposures to 
CCPs therefore significantly reducing the trading cost.37 
The message is therefore clear, market stakeholders are favoring centralised regulated 
settlements and clearing systems rather than bilateral (dealer-investor) softly regulated 
ones.  The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is not an exception 
and its 2018 annual survey shows, despite the market pushing for a centralised clearing, 
that 83% of the survey respondents are confident that the market will  and/or remain 
the same, yet the future poses certain challenges mainly linked to regulatory 
compliance. As a result, almost half the respondents believe that the numbers of dealers 
will decrease and almost 66% think the costs of dealing with derivatives will go in the 
opposite direction.38 Good and bad news one would say.  
 
4. Could technology deliver what the market expects?  
 
Even though high volume of financial derivatives are exchange- traded and go through 
heavily regulated centralised clearing systems and organizations, like the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (Nasdaq), the over the 
counter derivatives are offered on a bilateral basis between dealers, without any need 
to use regulated intermediaries or CCPs, who may absorb the credit risk.39 As a result, 
some risks are readily apparent; ‘access to information’ with the resulting lack of 
transparency seems to be the obvious one, to say nothing of facing the insolvency of 
the counterparty.  Lack of regulation was in fact the reason why financial regulators 
and governments struggled to measure the magnitude of the subprime crisis and its 
consequences.40 
                                                          
35 Financial Services Authority, The prudential regime for trading activities A fundamental review, 
August 2010, available at   http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp10_04.pdf.   
36 Candese G, Ranaldo A and Vasios M, Staff Working Paper No 751 OTC Premia, Bank of England, 
August 2018 at 11.  
37 Candese G, Ranaldo A and Vasios M, Staff Working Paper No 751 OTC Premia, Bank of England, 
August 2018 at 11.  “Counterparty capital charges differentiate between margined and unmargined non 
CCP transactions too. This is because initial margin reduces the amount of exposure for OTC 
derivatives transactions”… “With respect to the leverage ratio, its calculation does not recognize 
collateral or other credit risk mitigants as an offset to derivatives exposures. This is fundamentally 
different to the risk-weighted framework, which favours the exchange of initial margin in centrally or 
bilaterally cleared transactions.”    
38 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA Future of Derivatives Survey, available at 
https://www.isda.org/2018/04/24/isda-future-of-derivatives-survey/ 
39 Avgouleas E and Kiayias A, The Promise of Blockchain Technology for Global Securities and 
Derivatives Markets: The New Financial Ecosystem and the “Holy Grail” of Systemic Risk 
Containment, University of Edinburg, School of Law, Research Paper Series, No 2018/43 at p 4 
40 De Filippi P, Wright A, Blockchain and The Law. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2018  at 93 
As instantaneous settlements are unneeded in OTC’s41 blockchains, as underlying 
distribute ledger technology, seem to be the way forward to avoid the above scenario.  
A smart OTC system will develop a transparent tamper –resistant and resilient platform 
to create, execute, trade, trace and fairly value derivatives.42 Investing in collateralised 
debts obligations and/or credit default swaps, on a blockchain, will enable market 
participants to trace back the pool of mortgages converted into CDO’s, assess original 
mortgagors credit history and  value the tranches43 without having to rely on third party 
valuations. Consequently, investors could not only identify whether CDO’s or CDS’s 
refer to prime or subprime markets, but also whether the issuer has entered into other 
transactions which may impinge on his financial capability to fulfill its obligations. 
Banks liquidity ratios, accounts auditing and repo practices44 would be efficiently 
controlled and monitored. In other words, CDS’s investors could more efficiently asses 
the two types of risk behind these financial instruments namely: “the underlying credit 
risk of the reference entity and the counterparty risk faced by the CDS protection 
buyer.”45 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has not only acknowledged  how 
fertile territory OTCs are for smart contracts46 but also has endorsed the use of 
blockchain/DLT and smart contracts technology to further develop and improve 
‘derivative processes’ and recognizes that failing to adapt and/or adopt the changes, “ 
the derivatives infrastructure stands to become increasingly costly, risky and 
inefficient.”47 It also recognises that due to the nature of the transactions or events 
underpinning derivatives trade, not all those events needs automation therefore, it 
becomes paramount to identify in what parts of  a derivative contract automation would 
be efficient and effective.48Nonetheless, ISDA is also concerned that new technologies, 
regardless of their usefulness, should not disrupt the legal pillars on which its 
documentation architecture is founded.49 This foundation  links with ISDA Master 
Agreement and in fact, it is suggested that automation (smart contract code) is in 
                                                          
41 Samia E quoting Chadwick S, 2018, Blockchain to make big impact in OTC derivatives, syndicated 
loans and VCPE, available at in https://www.unlock-bc.com/news/2018-04-04/blockchain-to-make-
big-impact-in-otc-derivatives-syndicated-loans-and-vcpe. 
42 De Filippi P, Wright A, Blockchain and The Law. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2018, at 93 
43 McCoy P & Engel K,  The Subprime Virus, reckless credit, regulatory failure and next steps, New 
York, USA, Oxford University Press 2011   
44 A repo is an agreement to sell a financial product with the obligation to buy it back at a late stage. 
45 Aldasoro I & Ehlers T, The Credit Default Swap Market: what a difference a decade makes, BIS 
Quarterly Review, June 2018 pp 1-10 at 7 
46 ISDA, Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction.  January 2019 p 4,, available at 
https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/ 
47  ISDA and Linklaters LLP, Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, August 
2017, available at https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contractsand-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
perspective.pdf 
48 ISDA and King and Wood Mallesons, Whitepaper Smart Derivatives Contracts: From Concept to 
Construction, August 2018 at 4, available at https://www.isda.org/a/cHvEE/Smart-Derivatives-
Contracts-From-Concept-to-Construction-Oct-2018.pdf 
49 ISDA, Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction.  January 2019 p 5, available at 
https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/ 
 
principle used for payment obligations so in terms of contract formation, the master 
agreement should be the central pillar.50 
The ISDA whitepaper distinguishes between operational and non-operational clauses 
the latter of which are less susceptible to automation. Operational clauses refer to the 
happening of specified event, time or action to trigger the execution of the derivatives 
agreement.51 For example, futures, forwards, call or put options and swaps all depend 
on the happening of certain or indeed uncertain events, which activate the execution of 
the agreements thus, these seem to ‘embed some form of conditional logic’52 therefore 
are suitable for being automatically executed by smart contracts code. 
Conversely, there also are the so-called non-operational clauses in which such 
embedded logic is missing since they depend upon the bilateral legal relationship 
between the contracting parties.53 This lack of conditional logic makes them less 
suitable or entirely unsuitable for automation. For example, choice of law and 
jurisdiction clauses,54 contractual representations, delivery of certain documents to the 
counterparty, obligation subject to withholding tax, parties default,55 good faith in 
contractual formation and execution,56 even, as  highlighted earlier,57 the happening of 
                                                          
50 ISDA, Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction.  January 2019 p 7, available at 
https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/ 
51 ISDA and Linklaters LLP, Whitepaper Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger a Legal Perspective, 
2017, available at https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
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52 ISDA and Linklaters LLP, Whitepaper Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger a Legal Perspective, 
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payment date equal to the product of a calculation amount, a floating rate (plus or minus a spread) and 
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settlement price exceeds the forward price or vice versa; and • A clause that requires a party to transfer 
assets on a particular date that have a value equal to the amount by which a required credit support 
amount is less than the value of collateral provided, subject to certain formulaic haircuts and 
adjustments.” 
53 ISDA and Linklaters LLP, Whitepaper Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger a Legal Perspective, 
2017, available at https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
perspective.pdf. At 11  
54 See below Validating and executing the Agreement 
55 ISDA, Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction.  January 2019 p 4, available at 
https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/ 
56 ISDA and Linklaters LLP, Whitepaper Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger a Legal Perspective, 
2017, available at https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
perspective.pdf. At 11 … “ … A clause providing that the written legal document represents the entire 
agreement between the parties; • A representation that a party’s obligations under the legal agreement 
constitute legal, valid and binding obligations; • A clause that dictates that when making a decision or a 
determination, the person making the calculation shall do so in good faith and in a commercially 
reasonable manner; and • A clause that provides that all transactions entered into under a master 
agreement form a single agreement between the parties.” 
57 Bacon L, Brook N, Bazinas G, Smart Contracts: Where Law Meets Technology, Clyde and Co 
Inside, available: https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/smart-contracts-where-law-meets-
technology.  [June 2016] 
events, which occur outside the pre-coded contractual language and may affect 
contractual enforceability e.g. Fraud, Force Majeure and Frustration.58 
 Consequently, ISDA 2018 whitepaper has highlighted “four fundamental principles 
for…. the development of smart derivative contracts:  
1. Smart derivative contracts should be compatible with existing standards 
2. Only those parts of a derivatives contract that are  capable of being automated 
should be considered 
3. Effective automation should be based on legal validation 
4. Only those parts of a derivatives contracts where there exists sufficient benefit 
in automating should be considered for automation.”59 
  
4.1 Validating and executing the agreement: What should or not be 
automated?   
 
The market for financial derivatives is technologically developed, most parties use the 
standard terms of agreements (ISDA agreement), accounts are settled in an organised, 
repeatable and predictable way, save for market fluctuations which affect returns. 
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, there are more than 
875 member institutions from 68 countries and the market is worth trillions of US 
dollars. Stakeholders include issuers, investors, intermediaries, regulators; in the case 
of collateralised debt obligations, even original mortgagors may have interest. 
Consequently, without technological assistance clearing counterparties will struggle 
and should start planning for mass events e.g., data reconciliation. ISDA recognises that 
the market urgently needs DLT/Blockchain technology to speed up clearing, 
reconciliation and modularisation (identifying regulation where multiple legal sources 
apply to individual transactions).  
The ISDA master agreement, the customary contract governing all transactions, 
provides the market with a good deal of standardisation thus solid foundations for 
implementing technology. Arguably, the bilateral nature of OTC’s leaves room for 
tailor-made or customised contractual terms leading to a complex combination of 
documents with a variety of obligations,60 for example, collateral documentation, 
protocols, amendments agreements and clearing documentation.61The following 
illustration corroborates this argument.  
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59 ISDA, Legal Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction, January 2019 pp 10-12, 
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60 ISDA, Legal Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction, January 2019 p 13, available 
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61 Ibid at 21. See also Section 1(c) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement. 
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ISDA guidelines for smart derivatives contracts is clear that validating the agreement 
poses a very serious task, especially for lawyers who must do their best endeavor to 
align the effect of the smart code with the legal effect of the contract.62 The situation 
becomes more difficult still because some derivative agreements hedge the financial 
exposure created by other derivatives contract63 thus both contracts, to some extent 
work in conjunction with each other.  
There are nevertheless, at least three issues, which are worth covering in here. The first 
one is the automation of contract formation and the pre-contractual and post-contractual 
duty of ‘Good Faith’.  The concept implies the use of a subjective test to ascertain 
whether any contractual party has acted in a way that impinges either contract formation 
or execution, in other words in an unreasonable manner. Some comparative comments 
may assist in understanding the issue.  
                                                          
62 ISDA, Legal Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: Introduction, January 2019 p 11, available 
at https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/ 
63 Ibid. 
The contractual duty of good faith is a principle of no legal general application in the 
United Kingdom;64 nevertheless, the High Court in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International 
Trade Corp Ltd65  took the prominent view that in long-term contractual relationships 
the duty of good faith should be present during the entire existence of the contract 
namely formation and execution. Thus, Mr. Justice Leggatt concluded, “traditional 
English hostility towards a doctrine of good faith in the performance of contracts, to 
the extent that it still persists, is misplaced”66 
Conversely, in Germany contractual  parties could incur ‘Culpa in Contraendo (fault in 
contracting)’ in accordance with  Art 311 II BGB “ a party that fails to observe diligence 
in negotiating contracts commits a breach of its contractual obligations and is 
accountable for the other party reliance losses.” Thus, groundless breaking of a contract 
in formation could lead to a claim for damages if the innocent party justifiably counted 
on a contract coming into existence. Equally, in France in accordance with the principle 
of ‘Abuse de Droit’ (bad faith without malice will suffice)   parties must act in good 
faith not only during contract execution yet during contract formation so 
“Responsabilite Precontractuelle” is a clear possibility.  
The above comments have not been made in isolation; on the contrary, they endorse 
ISDA concerns about subjective factors which may affect contract formation and smart 
derivative agreements, using or not blockchain technology, may assist very little with 
parties’ ‘state of mind’  at the time they enter or execute the agreement.  
One argument, which favours automation, is nevertheless, the possibility of having 
access to the contractual history of the counterparty so it would become apparent when 
such party, acting in good or bad faith, enters into agreements or other obligations, 
which may affect his/her, ability to perform the derivatives agreement. Blockchain 
technology could effectively  retrieve this tamper-resistant data.  
The second issue connects with the misselling of financial products claims. They have 
found almost an unsurmountable obstacle when UK courts took the approach that 
sophisticated investors, those with accurate knowledge and experience in the market 
for financial derivatives for example, are in a position of understanding, accessing the 
risk and valuing the instruments in which they invest portfolios. Such level of 
sophistication made it impossible for claimants to prove ‘inducement’ as requirement 
to succeed in a claim for misrepresentation.67 In other words, the victim of a misleading 
                                                          
64 Lord Bingham in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 at 
439 are often quoted:  “In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the 
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statement must prove that he/she relied on it and was induced to enter into the 
agreement in such terms or that without that statement he/she would not  have entered 
into the agreement at all or would have done it but on different terms.  
Two questions without potential legal answer are “how do I know the code, as written 
in the contract, reflects my intentions if I cannot read it? And how do I know the effect 
of the code, when executed by a machine, will be what I intend?”68 Potential solutions 
are twofold either for lawyers, as legal advisors, to learn and understand the relevant 
language used to write the code or for the industry to come up with standard codes for 
‘particular pieces of conditional logic’.69 
Regardless of concerns about smart codes embedded in DLT/Blockchain,   it is the 
author’s view that the use of smart derivatives contracts could potentially end claims 
for negligent misrepresentation. The nature and features of blockchain will allow 
market participants to verify and double check the veracity and marketability of the 
financial instrument and most importantly, reject by lack of consensus inaccurate or 
tampered data. It may happen that even though ISDA’s concerns about subjective 
elements are valid and worth taken into consideration, the benefits of automation may 
lead to a significant reduction of misrepresentation claims.  
The third issue is about choice of law and jurisdiction to resolve derivatives disputes, 
as correctly emphasised by the ISDA/Linklaters white paper.70 In relation to financial 
contracts, as far as English Law is concerned, the applicable law to determine place of 
performance is the law where the contractual obligation is or will be discharged. In the 
same line, the place of payment is where the debtor is domiciled.71  However, other 
jurisdictions may have different rules of construction for example, when a 
dematerialised asset is created, the law applicable to the place where it has been 
registered and/or where the register is situated.72  Interestingly enough, should the 
system move to DLT/Blockchain technology, where by definition nodes  distribute 
across the globe, ascertaining the applicable law and jurisdiction73 is very challenging 
indeed. One answer could be requiring the majority of nodes to come from a specific 
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5.  Possible Structure and Functioning  of Smart OTC’s Derivatives    
 
Fig 5 source: Adolfo Paolini 
 
The underlying complexity, size and control of this segment of the financial market, 
would require a permissioned (consortium) private blockchain led by CCP’s, ISDA or 
participating banks, with access to financial regulators,74 allowing the latter to control 
anti-money laundering, fair competition, the financing of illegal activities alongside the 
contractual execution of derivatives trade agreements. The advantage of 
DLT/Blockchain at this point would be to provide regulators with more efficient tools 
to trace back the proceeds of crime and guarantee efficiency and transparency in the 
market thus ameliorating or substantially avoiding the effects of systemic risks. 
Regulatory compliance is a high hurdle indeed and  Regtech is meant to play its role in 
here, by further developing a private blockchain with access to regulators and 
algorithms specially written  to control money laundering e.g. silk road,75 free 
competition and where applicable financial regulation, monetary policy and liquidity.  
Secondly, the author is of the view that using a standardised contract like the ISDA 
master agreement, substantially simplifies the OTC smart process and gives 
stakeholders high levels of security and scrutiny. Entering into similar contracts with 
other partakers arguably benefits certainty. The final layer is the automation itself 
where the integrated smart contact would execute the agreement by adjusting margins, 
novation, settlements or just making the order to deliver either the price difference or 
the physical asset. Automation needs to be at the spine of derivative trading where, 
contrary to what happen in securities trading (short periods), derivatives need 
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(contract execution and 
updating) 
intermediation for the entire duration of the agreement (long periods) which, could 
last several years,76 therefore exposing the counter parties to longer periods of risk.  
 
 
5.1 Platform and Network Requirements  
 
Highlighting the basic features, including a basic definition, of what a derivative is, 
may help in understanding what problems, if any, technology is to resolve. A derivative 
is a contract which derives its value from something else or “… a financial instrument 
(or more simply an agreement between two people) that has a value determined by the 
price of something else.”77 The three main purposes for using these instruments are 
gambling or speculation, hedging solutions or risk management and arbitrage.78 These 
three purposes underpin all three types of derivatives, futures or forwards,79 options and 
swaps. What seems to be common denominators of any type of derivative contract are 
the facts that they all mirror the underlying asset (subject matter of the derivative 
agreement) and contracting parties worry about prices falling or rising therefore, both 
parties hedge the risk. Furthermore, contracting parties could get out of the contract by 
novation (deleting the original agreement and replacing it with a new one), including 
the possibility of physically honoring the agreement or just receiving the price variation. 
Novation is in fact what happens where clearing takes place through a central clearing 
counterparty (CCP) contrary to that in bilateral trading where the parties are always the 
same until the end of the agreement.80 
Consequently, the OTC is very time and effort consuming indeed, since it uses a 
significant number of interacting parties. A smart OTC platform will significantly 
shorten the multi-party machine of modern finance, which includes the originating 
bank, correspondent, clearinghouse, a broker, settlement agency and payment 
processor.81     
Due to the size of this market and the high pace at which transactions take place, latency 
becomes a serious issue. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation for example, 
deals with 10000 transactions per second82 so any   new model cannot afford delays 
before the execution of a transaction begins, this could be very costly indeed. It is 
suggested that latency may be induced by the requirement that all nodes need to 
communicate in synchronise way.83 Developing or implementing a consensus 
algorithm like Ripple, which uses a number of trusted subnetworks, thus requiring 
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81 Casey MJ & Vigna P, The Truth Machine The Blockchain and the Future of Everything, Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2018 at 153 
82 Ibid at 162 
83 Schwartz D, Young N & Britto A, The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm. 2014, available at 
https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf. Accessed on 19/01/19 
minimal connectivity to achieve consensus84 could help to this end. Financial 
institutions and other payment providers use RippleNet (Xcurrent, Xrapid and Xvia) to 
exchange in a very expeditious and low cost way foreign currency, cryptocurrencies 
and other tokens, by using a number of liquidity providers who compete each other to 
provide the best exchange rate thus its low cost and speedy process or real time 
settlements.85 Should the system adopt a more quicker/safer platform arguably will 
accelerate transactions and the releasing of moneys and/or other assets held as 
collaterals, unlocking trillions of dollars86, to finance new ventures and market growth.  
Looking for example at new products  like Interdax with a capability of 300.000 
transactions per second,87 one can clearly see the magnitude of computational capacity 
required to efficiently run the consensus platform. The way forward seems to be liaising 
with Fintech start-ups and/or global consortia,88 as suggested in the structure of this 
smart system.  
Building on the above comments, two complications unfold storage and speed. The first 
one does not seem to be serious bearing in mind than banks are major stakeholders and 
should have the hardware resources.  Regarding speed, as already suggested, Ripple 
alike systems could be advantageous to say nothing of new market player e.g. Interdax 
and Axoni.89 
Additionally, the networking layer will require several nodes, it is impossible to keep a 
record, as full node, of every transaction in the clearing system. Derivatives depend on 
future events, which require periodical updates therefore the need for a very 
comprehensive network of contributors who could actually keep the ecosystem in 
motion. Banks could also act as exchangers to facilitate access to the so-called clearing 
platform, albeit OTC’s may trade bilaterally. 
The design also requires the integration of smart contracts and distributed ledger 
technology in the following terms: DLT/Blockchain will store data and host the smart 
contract; to this end, it will recall all the information using code.90 Smart contracts 
would guarantee that trading actions (OTC creation, margins, execution and trade) 
happen automatically finally, the DLT/Blockchain will record changes to the 
transactions91  thus keeping a traceable or historical record of both the underlying 
contract and the financial instrument. ISDA suggest that this implementation uses 
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separate pieces of smart contract code because no transaction is alike therefore, they 
could have different parameters e.g. inputs, times and calculation methodologies.92 
It is necessary to emphasise nevertheless, the potential need for oracles to adjust the 
constant market value fluctuation of the instrument, affected by interest rates, Libor 
rates and stock prices.93 Oracles are outsiders, either individuals or programmes who 
help the blockchain to interact with the outside world in order to make any adjustments 
in real time.94 This interaction could prove costly nonetheless market players, in the 
OTC ecosystem, are wealthy enough to put in motion the best possible technological 
solutions to tackle scalability, efficiency, fair trade and lack of trust. A good example 
is the ISDA Common Domain Model version 1.0, which builds on Financial Products 
Markup Language (FpML).95 This is a machine-readable programme able to represent 
happening of events during the life of the derivative agreement such as transaction-
level clauses and in the future will be covering equity derivatives products and collateral 
data.96 
Additionally and without wanting to sound too ambitious indeed, a single decentralised 
cryptocurrency could simplify and reduce costs in the clearing and settlement process.  
This idea of course carries high risk namely the volatility of any cryptocurrency.97 To 
this end, JP Morgan has announced plans to use JPM crypto coins to settle payments 
between clients,98 thus the future is already here.  Central Banks on the other hand  may 
soon move to fiat digital currency and  the project is already under consideration,99 with 
the immediate effect of simplifying even further derivative trading and possibly 
disrupting currency swaps due to the fact that foreign conversion rates may not be 
needed.   
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5.2 Application Layer Advantages  
 
Crucial to the ongoing discussion is to identify whom would use and benefit from the 
OTC smart system and the list contains at least the following stakeholders:  
 The European Market Infrastructure Regulation on Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories (EMIR) requires central clearing 
counterparties, which are arguably the one who will control, scrutinise and grant 
access to the permissioned smart system. The International Swap Derivatives 
Association and participating banks for example, will manage the private 
blockchain. 
 The second stakeholder, as already emphasised above, is the financial regulator 
whose supervisory and controlling power would exercise real time monitoring 
of the chain of transactions. Direct access to the blockchain system gives the 
financial regulator the opportunity to identify early bad players, including 
money-laundering concerns alongside the normal supervision of the market 
financial stability.  
 The third stakeholder is the trader itself who benefits from taking part in a more 
expeditious and trustworthy system. Blockchains are unamendable hence; data 
inputs will remain unchangeable in the chain therefore some data concerns arise.  
 Brokers and other intermediaries like DTCC100 may no need to maintain 
physical stock certificates101  or any other relevant documentation to which the 
OTC’s refer.   
In a market, which exceeds 11 Trillion US dollars, one could identity several 
advantages for sophisticated investors who will be enable to trace the underlying 
contract from which the derivate instrument steams in the first place. The benefit is 
immeasurable in the sense that the market  will have the opportunity of credibly 
assessing the value and risk of OTC’s, to say nothing of putting in motion a system 
which could earlier identity ‘bad actors’. As a result, the market expects significant 
behavioral changes in consumers and issuers of derivatives in the sense that the system 
would be more reliable and trustworthy thus, propelling financial investment even 
further. 
Therefore, the behavioral change in consumers at the execution phase of the process is 
necessary. Whereas contract formation will change very little, the challenge is with 
contract execution. The disruption caused by moving from traditional ways to execute 
OTC’s, needs replacing by a trustworthy and auditable system where  intermediary may 
become redundant. At this stage, it would be crucial that stakeholders educate users and 
explain the benefits of the automation or technology integration of the clearing process.  
Behavioral changes, at the core of financial institutions, are also expected. Adopting a 
more efficient, cheaper and trustworthy OTC clearing platform may have an effect on 
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competitive behavior allowing new players with innovative or disruptive ideas, to 
access the market and gain a share of it.102  
Even though OTC’s are privately traded and there is or was  no need to go through a 
clearing counterparty, as major players in the OTC market,  Banks’ workflow will 
significantly reduce by replacing several layers in their organisational structure for 
example, due diligence, compliance, reporting, all of which could be simplified and 
audited quicker and cheaper. This explains why 20% of blockchain technology patents 
belong to banks and the market presumes that the industry would spend in the region 
of US$ 400 million on related projects.103 
Regarding value, it verifies stakeholders’ liquidity, collaterals and contributions; using 
code, margins could automatically adjust to reflect changes in the market and most 
importantly its tamper- resistant record of transactions will help in verifying the  
underlying transaction and whether investors have entered into other agreements which 
may impinge in their ability to fulfil  obligations.104All resulting in a more transparent 
and profitable market for OTC trade.   
Arguably, blockchain will facilitate market players’ identity105 and sophisticated 
investors could hugely benefit from it. The challenge is that large-scale identification 
processes could in essence be difficult to achieve.106  However, having a reliable and 
secure identification system would open more doors for accessing credit, enforcing, 
protecting, transferring and claiming legal rights, to say nothing of being a quicker and 
more effective ways to resolve crimes or commercial disputes. The burden of proof 
could be easier in the sense that behavior patterns or predictions,107 digitally recorded, 
could effectively identify the wrongdoer and protect the market. 
 
5.3 Exponential Growth, Know Your Customer and Privacy Concerns  
 
Bearing in mind that by providing diversity and access to more market participants 
(private and small businesses) financial gains is just another additional motive for the 
implementation of a more efficient smart system. However, market growth is fraught 
with new regulatory, monitoring and supervising tests. As trustworthy and less 
expensive new system, the market is likely to attract not only ‘highly standardised 
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derivatives contacts but also tailor-made ones,’108  nevertheless the question still open 
as to whether exceptionally risky and/or complex contracts would need to use CCPs’ 
premium services.109 Undoubtedly, blockchain technology will catapult the number of 
market participants (customers) in financial services. As Emmanuelle Ganne110 clearly 
identified, there are three possible ways in which Blockchain is about to propelled 
access to finance at all levels including OTC trade:  first this tampered resistant 
innovative system can be used to reconcile customers credit history and 
creditworthiness which happens to be difficult for sole traders of small/medium size 
enterprises. Secondly, as resources scarce, small market participants do not have the 
ability to deal with complex financial negotiations thus, blockchain will  open new 
income streams for banks by allowing access to a large number of new traders. Thirdly, 
intermediary banks may become redundant, as blockchain, on a peer-to-peer basis, 
allows new market players to partake in international trade without having to secure 
conventional trade finance111 in other words, at a much lower cost. The WE.trade 
platform is one of the most eloquent examples already providing services to small and 
medium enterprises.112 This exponential growth increases data protection concerns.  
Building on previous comments, one crucial problem faced not only by central clearing 
counterparties but also financial services providers in general,  is data protection. All 
information will be visible to the nodes and this creates potential concerns with privacy. 
Private Blockchains would potentially resolved this problem alongside using specific 
codes in compliance with regulation and cross border control e.g.  Money laundering 
and consumer protection. In fact, the algorithmic code could include the possibility of 
identifying what sort of information consumers or market players are happy to share. 
The challenge of course is ‘controlling financial crime’ in a system where fraudsters 
only share the clean side of their credit history.  
Data protection is therefore a problem because individuals or nodes with 51% stake in 
the system do have the power to ‘attack and effectively take over the network’113 to 
update personal records, opening wide the doors for fictitious use or misuse of real 
identities.114 How could the system authenticate whether one's identity is real and not 
robotic?  How could it verify that individual skills, legal status, claimed ownership is 
genuine? Additionally, privacy rights will potentially disappear unless individuals 
could control what personal information is shared in a given moment. The 
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reputational damage suffered by individuals whose potentially whole identity is 
misused will undoubtedly be more severe and difficult to rebuild.   
Nakamoto whitepaper has already given the answer to privacy concerns namely the 
use of public keys. Keeping such keys anonymous will prevent the public for linking 
information to someone so they can only see the subject matter of the transaction and 
not the identity of the parties involved.115 The actual OTC and banking system give us 
little choice thus we need to trust them as custodians of our money, repositories of our 
transactions and the way assets are electronically transferred, “we have to trust them 
with our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our accounts.”116  
It is not the aim of this article to explore how the new European Union General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) may affect Blockchain technology.  In its own right, it 
is the subject matter of another piece of research nevertheless; it is worth making 
some brief comments, which build on the excellent material published by Michele 
Fick.117  
In order to be within the remit of GDPR rules, data must be personal and identifiable 
and/or attributable to natural persons. This means that total anonymity will exclude 
the application of GDPR rules because ‘it is no longer deemed’ as personal data. 
Finck distinguishes nevertheless two sets of data, which could, in principle, be 
described as personal therefore covered by GDPR: Transactional data stored in the 
Blockchain and public keys.118 The first one refers to personal data, which could 
identify financial records and behavior.  
Public keys namely the combination of letters and numbers, which make it possible to 
identify natural or corporate persons, represent a more serious challenge for GDPR,119 
it all depends on anonymity.  Should the public key be entirely anonymous GDPR 
rules will not apply conversely, where suck keys matched, with additional information 
are attributable to identified individuals, GDPR operates in full.120 However, it is too 
early to predict how GDPR rules will be interpreted in specific scenarios.121 
Looking at other regulatory concerns, Michele Finck has also rightly identified four 
drivers affecting current and future regulation namely: the cross-jurisdictional nature 
of OTC’s, decentralisation, anonymity and increased adoption.122  
                                                          
115 Nakamoto, S, Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, available at https://bitcoin.org/ 
bitcoin.pdf. p6 “This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time 
and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were.” 
116 Nakamoto S, Bitcoin open source implementation of P2P currency, 2009, available at  
http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bitcoin-open-source 
117 Finck M, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 
118 Finck M, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 at 
93 
119 See Pseudonymisation Article 4(5) General Data Protection Regulation. 
120 Finck M, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 at 
96 
121 For an excellent analysis about Blockchain and GDPR   please see Finck M, Blockchain Regulation 
and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 Chapter 4 pp 88-116  
122 Finck M, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2019 pp 
58-64 
Let us briefly cover each. The international nature of derivatives, as discussed above, 
poses difficulties in ascertaining several legal aspects associated with applicable law 
and enforceability for example  where the agreement has entered into, executed or 
breached, where payment is made, parties domicile. To this end, some jurisdictions like 
Germany and UK are suggesting global regulation for innovative financial 
technology.123 
Decentralisation peer-to-peer interconnectivity (Nodes) could be and in fact are 
dispersed around the world therefore; users could download, upload and exchange data 
without effective monitoring and supervision control by financial regulators.  
The pseudonymous nature of DLT/Blockchain requires vast financial investment in 
computational resources to identify users including bad ones. There could be 
confrontational issues between fighting anonymity and privacy rights protection and it 
is Finck’s view that Blockchain is not anonymous enough to meet the requirements of 
the General Data Protection Regulation.124 
Finally, scalability or increased adoption makes enforcing the rules technically 
challenging e.g. uncontrollable with the obvious consequence of creating a social 
rejection of regulatory intervention.125 Irrespective of our views on these matters, it is 
too early to challenge and/or defy the law because Blockchain technology, in both 




6. Conclusion  
 
C+Q+T+FC+RC=BM 
Cheaper + Quicker + Trustworthy +Fair Competition +Risk Control = Better Market  
 
The value transfer of DLT/Blockchain in OTC’s is immense. Several  benefits are 
seemingly apparent: less intermediaries would significantly reduce cost, the time for 
settling payments would almost be instantaneous and the accuracy of the information 
would be thoroughly scrutinised by consensus (Cost-time-veracity).  
Blockchains  would allow for diversity and competing systems, which would not be 
necessary, connected to each other, therefore spreading the risk between smaller 
market players (CCPs) so the failure of a clearinghouse, may not result in systemic 
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risks.126 The market expects competitive behavior linked to financial innovation, 
leading to a more equitable share of its benefits.  
Immutable records are paramount for the smart OTC market. Should data insecurely 
mutate, tracing records, the history of transactions and most importantly financial 
settlements would be virtually impossible to scrutinise. Mutability poses a serious 
actual risk to the clearing and settlement system and this new technology will help in 
resolving it. An immutable record would guarantee transparency and trust so investors 
would have access to tamper-resistant data to better asses the risk.  Using a ledger 
visible to participants could also spot inaccurate information and reject it in addition 
to identifying, much earlier, bad market actors. 
Behavioural changes in consumers due to moving out of traditional ways to do 
business will soon follow so the task for stakeholders is to disseminate and educate 
the market in the sense that well-educated markets thrive in businesses.  
Financial Institutions would adopt more efficient, cheaper and trustworthy clearing 
platforms where current legal standards and principles will interact with smart 
contracts. Clarifying what the correct legal construction of a smart contract and/or 
code is, would trigger its use and benefits.  
A robust Legal framework is also paramount. There are several questions without 
clear-cut answers namely, what law would apply to resolve disputes?  Breaches will 
happen in the cyberspace thus, which court would have jurisdiction to hear the claim?  
May we need cyber courts?127 Most importantly and since this is a peer -to -peer 
system, would all peers share responsibility? Alternatively, would the victim have to 
identify the individual wrongdoer, which would be almost impossible?  
 
The authors humble answer to the question will DLT/Blockchain disrupt the financial 
derivatives market?  YES IT WILL making it more transparent, diverse, efficient, 
cheaper and more socially inclusive.  
 
“The services industry has, like other industries, been affected by the rise of new 
technologies, in particular the internet. New business models have emerged. The 
advent of blockchain technology could further reshuffle the deck.”128  
 
Dr Adolfo Paolini 
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